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A Convex Scheme for the Secrecy Capacity of a MIMO Wiretap
Channel with a Single Antenna Eavesdropper
Jennifer Chakravarty, Oliver Johnson, Robert Piechocki
Abstract—Security has traditionally been dealt with at layers
higher than the physical layer but in the wake of 5G, security at
all layers is necessary to deal with the variations in complexity
of connected devices. Low power devices may use physical layer
security as a solution, while other devices may use physical layer
security to complement security at higher layers. One key metric
for physical layer security is the secrecy capacity. This is the
maximum rate that a system can transmit with perfect secrecy.
Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) and Massive MIMO
systems look likely to play a part in 5G, but the secrecy capacity
for such systems is not fully understood. For a Gaussian MIMO
channel, the secrecy capacity is a non-convex optimisation
problem for which a general solution is not available. This paper
presents an optimisation scheme that enables us to determine
the secrecy capacity of a MIMO system with a single eavesdrop
antenna. It is shown that, for certain parameters, the presented
scheme is a concave problem which can therefore be solved
efficiently using existing convex optimisation software.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To meet ever-increasing demands for higher capacity and
throughput, the launch of 5G is approaching, with aims
to be commercially available by 2020 [1]. These require-
ments, partly fuelled by an explosion in the number of
connected devices, cannot be satisfied by current commu-
nications technologies and Multiple-Input, Multiple-Output
(MIMO) systems and Massive MIMO (a MIMO system
with 100+ antennas at the base station) [2] are among
the technologies hoped to be used for 5G [3]. In light of
5G and the reduced complexity requirements of emerging
trends in technology such as low power connected Internet
of Things (IoT) devices, security at physical layer has had
a renewal of interest. Typically security is dealt with at
higher layers than physical, but due to the stacked layers
in communication devices, physical layer security may also
work in tandem with higher layers. Cryptographic techniques,
and other security methods, rely on generated randomness,
which can be computationally heavy. Physical layer security
exploits the randomness already available in the channel,
typically the wireless medium, and thus is promising for low
complexity devices.
Physical layer security has an information theoretic foun-
dation and is theoretically unbreakable. Quantifying security
in terms of information leakage was first considered by
Shannon in [4] and the traditional model stems from Wyner’s
work in 1975 [5], the ‘Wiretap Channel’ seen in Figure 1. The
typical set up considered involves two legitimate users, Alice
and Bob, transmitting across a channel with an eavesdropper,
Eve. The information theoretic constructs give an idea of how
much useful information the eavesdropper is able to obtain,
known as the information leakage. These secrecy measures,
which depend on block length and the channel quality are
independent of computational power and thus applicable to
any technologies.
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Fig. 1. The Wiretap Channel [5].
The model for communication in a MIMO system is
different to that of a traditional single antenna wireless
communication and thus existing security methods and phys-
ical layer methods must be adapted and explored for these
systems. With multiple antennas, the users have channel
matrices rather than just channel coefficients, and with these
matrices come an increased number of degrees of freedom
in the system design. This paper focuses on the maximum
rate at which Alice may transmit to Bob reliably without
Eve gaining any useful information, known as the secrecy
capacity. The secrecy capacity of a channel is the theoretical
maximum rate for secure, reliable communications in the
presence of an eavesdropper and is formally defined below.
Definition 1.1: Consider a code with rate R= km/m where
m is the blocklength for a message of length km. The secrecy
capacity, Cs, is the supremum of all rates R such that there
exist sequences of codes with parameters (m,km,εm,δm) -
where εm is the error threshold and δm is the equivocation
rate - with the following properties
lim
m→∞
km
m
≥ R
lim
m→∞εm = limm→∞δm = 0.
Currently, the secrecy capacity of the MIMO channel is
known to be a nonconvex optimisation problem which is dif-
ficult to solve in general. This paper presents an optimisation
scheme which is convex and can be used to give the secrecy
capacity and the corresponding input covariance matrix.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section II
introduces the channel setup and the previous work on
secrecy capacity for MIMO systems. Section III formulates
the problem addressed and states the main theorem. The
proof of this theorem is presented in Section IV. Finally,
Section V concludes and discusses the relevance of the result.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
A. Setup
Let n denote the number of antennas at the transmitter, nB
denote the number of antennas at the legitimate receiver and
nE the number of antennas at the eavesdropper.
The channel between the transmitter and the legitimate
receiver shall be referred to as the main channel while the
channel between the transmitter and the eavesdropper shall
be referred to as the eavesdropper channel. Their channel
matrices are described by the matrices HB, an nB×n matrix
for the main channel and HE , an nE × n matrix for the
eavesdropper channel. For convenience, we will define the
following symmetric n×n matrices
KB = (H∗BHB)
1
2 , (1)
KE = (H∗EHE)
1
2 . (2)
The received vectors at Bob and Eve, denoted Y and Z
respectively, are:
Y = HBX +NB,
Z = HEY +NE .
where NB and NE are the noise vectors for the two channels.
The input signal is subject to a power constraint P such that
the trace of the covariance matrix, Q is bounded above by
P. That is,
TrQ =
n
∑
i=1
E[XiX∗i ]≤ P.
For the Gaussian wiretap channel the noise vectors are
assumed to be Gaussian with zero mean and identity covari-
ance:
NB ∼ N(0, InB),
NE ∼ N(0, InE ).
The noise is independent between channel realisations. Due
to the assumption of statistical independence between the
antenna elements, the channel matrices HB and HE are
modelled to have IID entries.
B. Secrecy Capacity
For the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel, the secrecy
capacity, Cs, was found in [6], [7] and independently in [8]
to be of the form:
Cs = max
Q:Tr(Q)≤P
}logdet(InB +HBQH∗B)
− logdet(InE +HEQH∗E) (3)
such that Q 0, where P is the power constraint of the system
and Q is the n×n covariance matrix of the input signal.
The secrecy capacity is achieved for an input of symbols
with a Gaussian distribution while using the full power
available, P. The optimisation problem in Equation (3) is
generally not easily solved for Q. The problem is nonconvex
and the solution is only known for certain scenarios. For
an overview of special cases which are known see [9]. The
Multiple Input Single Output (MISO) system, where nB = 1
is fully understood with the optimal Q and Cs being known
in closed form determined in [6]. These results hold for
any number of eavesdrop antennas. The only known case
with multiple receive antennas, nB is the ‘2-2-1’ case, with
n= nB = 2 and nE = 1. The optimal Q and Cs was established
in [10].
Although the general maximum is not known in closed
form, there is a numerical method by [11] giving an algorithm
to obtain the secrecy capacity, with an associated proof of
convergence to the optimum based on a matrix power series
expansion.
The main work in this paper reformulates the secrecy
capacity into a convex problem so that existing convex
optimisation tools may be used to solve for Q. The scheme is
valid for nB ≥ n and nE = 1, which covers a family of MIMO
systems which are not yet fully understood theoretically.
III. MAIN RESULT
We first define a new optimisation problem to solve
Equation (3). By [12, p73] the logdet(X) is concave for
positive semidefinite matrices X . Since Q is restricted to
positive semidefinite matrices, the arguments
InB +HBQH
∗
B
and
InE +HEQH
∗
E
will also be positive semidefinite and thus
logdet(InB +HBQH
∗
B)
and
logdet(InE +HEQH
∗
E)
are concave. However, in general, their difference is neither
convex nor concave. Thus we define the following problem:
max
Tr(Q)≤P
{logdet(InB +HBQH∗B)− log(s)} , (4)
such that s = det(InE +HEQH
∗
E)
and Q 0.
Since det(M) is not a convex constraint for a general matrix
M, this further limits the problem space to one eavesdrop
antenna as this makes InE +HEQH
∗
E a scalar. By fixing s,
this becomes a concave problem. The scheme presented in
this paper varies the value of s and runs convex optimisation
software CVX [13] for each s. Each individual optimisation
gives an output of a corresponding optimal matrix Q. Define:
s(Q) = det(InE +HEQH
∗
E) (5)
and
f (Q) = logdet(InB +HBQH
∗
B)− logs(Q). (6)
θ(s) = max
Q:s(Q)=s
f (Q). (7)
A plot of θ(s) can be seen in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. θ(s) vs s for n = 2, nB = 3, nE = 1 and P = 10 for a particular HB
and HE .
Finding the secrecy capacity is now a case of finding
the maximum of θ(s). This is facilitated by the following
Theorem, which gives a concavity result for θ which is the
main result of our paper.
Let Qi be a matrix achieving the maximum value in (7)
corresponding to si, that is f (Qi) = θ(si), for i ∈ {1,2}. By
definition,
si = InE +HEQiH
∗
E . (8)
Without loss of generality, assume s1 ≥ s2. Let st be a convex
combination of s1 and s2:
st = ts1+(1− t)s2
for t ∈ [0,1].
Theorem 1: For nE = 1 and any nB ≥ n, then
θ(st)≥ tθ(s1)+(1− t)θ(s2),
if the matrices KB and KE from Equations (1) and (2) satisfy
s1
‖K−1B K2EK−1B ‖F
−1
≥max{λmax(HBQ1H∗B),λmax(HBQ2H∗B)}. (9)
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The main argument consists of multiple steps. These can
be broken down into the following:
1) Consider the problem defined in Equation (7) for a
convex combination of inputs. We find a lower bound
by applying new results by Courtade et al. [14].
2) Minimising the difference between the lower bound,
found in Step 1, with the desired lower bound.
3) Rewrite the upper and lower bounds in terms of sym-
metric matrices, resulting in the conditions stated in
Theorem 1.
A. Step 1
For the first step, we require the following lemma:
Lemma 1: Courtade et al. [14, Lemma 2] For positive
definite matrices A, B and t ∈ [0,1] we have that
logdet(tA+(1− t)B)
≥ t logdet(A)+(1− t) logdet(B)
+
t(1− t)
2max{λ 2max(A),λ 2max(B)}
‖A−B‖2F , (10)
where λmax(·) denotes the largest eigenvalue and ‖·‖F is the
Frobenius norm.
For ease of notation, define
C (A,B) =
‖A−B‖2F
2max{λ 2max(A),λ 2max(B)}
. (11)
The linear combination Qt = tQ1 +(1− t)Q2 satisfies the
constraint s(Qt) = st since nE = 1 and
st =t(InE s1+HEQ2H
∗
E)+(1− t)(InE s1+HEQ2H∗E)
=InE +HE(tQ1+(1− t)Q2)H∗E .
Hence
θ(st)≥ f (Qt). (12)
By Lemma 1, taking A = InB + HBQ1H
∗
B and B = InB +
HBQ2H∗B:
f (Qt) = logdet(InB +HBQtH
∗
B)− logst (13)
≥t logdet(InB +HBQ1H∗B)
+(1− t) logdet(InB +HBQ2H∗B)
− logst + t(1− t)C (A,B)
Rewriting Equation (13) gives
t{logdet(InB +HBQ1H∗B)− logs1}
+(1− t){logdet(InB +HBQ2H∗B)− logs2}
+ t(1− t)C (A,B).
+ t logs1+(1− t) logs2− log(ts1+(1− t)s2).
By the definition of f (·), this can be written as
t f (Q1)+(1− t) f (Q2)+ t(1− t)C (A,B)
+ t logs1+(1− t) logs2− log(ts1+(1− t)s2).
(14)
Since the Qi are optimal matrices, this is equal to
tθ(s1)+(1− t)θ(s2)+ t(1− t)C (A,B)
+ t logs1+(1− t) logs2− log(ts1+(1− t)s2). (15)
B. Step 2
We aim to minimise the difference between the convex
combination
t f (Q1)+(1− t) f (Q2)
in Equation (15) and the upper bound, θ(st). Thus we
introduce a constant κ(s1,s2) and show that:
Lemma 2: For t ∈ [0,1],
t log(s1)+(1− t) log(s2)− log(ts1+(1− t)s2)
≥−t(1− t)κ(s1,s2), (16)
for
κ(s1,s2) =
(s1− s2)2
2s21
(17)
a) Proof: Define
g(t) :=t log(s1)+(1− t) log(s2)
− log(ts1+(1− t)s2)+ t(1− t)κ(s1,s2). (18)
By construction, g(0)= g(1)= 0. To show that g(t)≥ 0 in the
interval t ∈ [0,1] is equivalent to showing that g(t) is concave
in this interval, therefore considering when g′′(t) ≤ 0. The
second derivative of g is:
g′′(t) =−2κ(s1,s2)+ (s1− s2)
2
s2t
.
Since s2 ≤ s1, g(t) is concave for the value of κ(s1,s2) in
Equation (17) 
C. Step 3
Combining Lemma 2 with Equation (10) means that The-
orem 1 will follow from Equation (15) if
‖A−B‖2F
2max{λ 2max(A),λ 2max(B)}
≥ κ(s1,s2)
≥ (s1− s2)
2
2s21
(19)
where as before
A := InB +HBQ1H
∗
B (20)
and
B := InB +HBQ2H
∗
B. (21)
Writing Q := Q1−Q2 for simplicity, the Frobenius norm on
the left of Equation (19) can be rewritten as
‖A−B‖2F = Tr(HBQH∗BHBQH∗B)
= Tr(QK2BQK
2
B)
= Tr((KBQKB)(KBQKB))
= Tr(RR) = Tr(RR∗)
= ‖R‖2F (22)
where symmetric matrix
R := KBQKB. (23)
Retrieving the value of Q from R requires that H∗BHB is
invertible which requires nB ≥ n.
Similarly, considering the numerator of the right hand side
of (19) gives:
(s1− s2)2 = (HEQH∗E)2
= Tr(QK2EQK
2
E)
= Tr((KEQKE)(KEQKE))
= Tr(RT RT )
≤ ‖RT‖2F (24)
≤ ‖R‖2F‖T‖2F . (25)
where
T := K−1B K
2
EK
−1
B . (26)
Here Equation (24) follows by Cauchy-Schwarz, for any
matrix C,
Tr(C2)≤ Tr(C∗C) = ‖C‖2F ,
and Equation (25) follows by the submultiplicative property
of the Frobenius norm [15, 5,6]. Therefore the inequality in
Equation (19) is satisfied when
‖R‖2F‖T‖2F
2s21
≤ ‖R‖
2
F
2max{λ 2max(A),λ 2max(B)}
. (27)
Since each of λ 2max(·), ‖T‖2F and s21 is positive, this follows
by rewriting Equation (9) in the form
s1 ≥max{λmax(A),λmax(B)}‖T‖F , (28)
and the proof of Theorem 1 is complete.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Although the expression for the secrecy capacity is known
for the Gaussian wiretap channel, it is not generally known
how to solve the optimisation problem for the covariance ma-
trix, Q. The method presented in this paper gives an efficient
way to search for the secrecy capacity of a MIMO system
and a corresponding covariance matrix for the transmission.
The use of existing convex optimisation schemes makes the
problem presented in Equation (3) manageable. We show that
it is possible to search numerically for the maximum using
linear combinations of variables.
The transmission scheme corresponding to this covariance
matrix will be information theoretically secure since the user
is guaranteed to be transmitting at or below the secrecy
capacity.
This scheme is specific to the case with nE = 1 and nB≥ n.
This is due to the requirements which arise in the derivation
of the proof. These requirements do however cover a family
of MIMO systems which are not fully understood at the time
of writing.
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